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Comment
The Saturnization of American Plants:
Infringement or Expansion of Workers' Rights?
General Motors Corporation (GM) and the United Auto-
mobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America (UAW) recently entered into a labor agreement' stipu-
lating the terms and conditions of employment 2 for GM's Sat-
urn facility, a new subsidiary in Spring Hill, Tennessee.3
Under the Saturn Agreement, GM recognized the UAW as la-
bor representative at the Saturn facility before hiring the start-
up work force.4 Because the Agreement also provided that cur-
rent GM workers would be given a hiring preference, 5 many of
1. Memorandum of Agreement Between Saturn Corporation and UAW
(June 28, 1985) (available at Minnesota Law Review) [hereinafter "Saturn
Agreement" or "Agreement"]. The term "Memorandum of Agreement" im-
plies no specific legal relationship, although the General Counsel analyzed the
"Memorandum of Agreement" as a binding agreement and the National Right
to Work Legal Defense Foundation asserted that it was a contract. See Gen-
eral Motors Corp., Saturn Corp., 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1187 (June 2, 1986)
(NLRB Gen. Counsel Advice Memorandum) [hereinafter "Advice
Memorandum"].
2. See Saturn Agreement, supra note 1, at 1 (preamble). The Saturn
Agreement states that "the UAW is recognized as the bargaining agent for the
operating and skilled technicians in the Saturn manufacturing complex." Id.
at 2. The Agreement also details the structure of the Saturn plant's work
units, the responsibilities of workers within the units, the work and vacation
schedule at Saturn, and a wage and seniority schedule that incorporates work
experience at other GM facilities. Id. at 6-11, 18-21, Attachment No. 1.
3. GM intends to build a new subcompact car at the Saturn facility. The
UAW became involved in the planning stages of plant development in 1983
when GM and the UAW established a study center to explore alternative ap-
proaches to staffing and operating a plant for car production in the United
States. See Saturn Agreement, supra note 1, at 1 (Preamble); Advice Memo-
randum, supra note 1, at 1188. Management at the Saturn facility intends to
hire 3000 workers to produce 250,000 cars yearly. Production is intended to be-
gin in 1990. Saturn Comes Down to Earth, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 10, 1986, at 58, 58.
4. See Advice Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1188 ("[T]he UAW is recog-
nized as the bargaining agent for the operating and skilled technicians in the
Saturn manufacturing complex.").
5. I& ("[T]o insure a fully qualified workforce, a majority of the full ini-
tial complement of operating and skilled technicians in Saturn will come from
GM-UAW units .... ").
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the workers who eventually would work at the Saturn facility
were already members of GM-UAW bargaining units. The Na-
tional Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation (Foundation) 6
challenged the Agreement, claiming that it forced GM to pre-
maturely recognize the UAW and thus preempted the newly
hired employees' right to choose a labor representative.7 Re-
6. The Foundation is a self-proclaimed advocate for workers opposed to
"compulsory unionism." The Foundation's objectives are "to enforce employ-
ees['] existing legal rights against forced unionism abuses" and to expand indi-
vidual employees' rights. The Foundation receives funding from private
contributions. THE NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEFENSE FOUNDATION,
INC., DEFENDING AMERICANS AGAINST INJUSTICES OF COMPULSORY UNIONISM
(publicity brochure available at 8001 Braddock Rd., Springfield, Va. 22160).
7. The Foundation and the General Counsel agreed that the Saturn
Agreement was signed before the hiring of all Saturn employees, see Advice
Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1188 (agreement signed on July 23, 1985, but
full complement of workers to be reached approximately two years after
plant's opening), but disagreed on whether the agreement appoints the UAW
as labor representative for the employees, see id. at 1191 (argument by Foun-
dation that GM recognized the UAW at inappropriate time had no merit). The
Foundation claimed that the Saturn Agreement extended prehire recognition
to the UAW, violating § 8(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (b)(1), and (b)(2) of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (b)(1), (b)(2)
(1982). See Letter from Foundation to Rosemary Collyer, Esq., General Coun-
sel of the NLRB (Dec. 6, 1985) at 3 (available at Minnesota Law Review).
Prehire recognition is recognition of a union by an employer prior to plant
opening. Because prehire recognition preempts the newly hired workers'
rights established in § 7 of the NLRA, it is a violation of § 8(a)(1), (a)(2), and
(a)(3). See, e.g., Sheraton Great Falls Inn, 242 N.L.R.B. 1255, 1256 (1979) (em-
ployer's execution of collective bargaining agreement before hiring work force
held improper).
Section 7 states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). The rights guaranteed by § 7 may not be restricted by
contract between management and the union. Carpenters' Local Union No.
1478 v. Stevens, 743 F.2d 1271, 1280 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1015
(1985).
The rights extended under § 7 are enforced through the § 8 provisions.
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA states that it is unlawful "to interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce employees in the exercise of [their] rights guaranteed in
[§ 7]." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982). Section 8(a)(1) is the broadest provision
under § 8(a) and encompasses both derivative and independent violations. See
4 NLRB Ann. Rep. 52 (1939). An employer who violates any of the other sub-
divisions of § 8(a) has also committed a derivative violation of § 8(a)(1). See id.
An independent violation of § 8(a)(1) occurs when the employer's conduct con-
stitutes a general obstruction of the employee's rights established under § 7.
The specific policy of § 8(a)(1) is to prohibit the use of management's economic
power to interfere with employees' free choice in representation decisions.
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jecting the Foundation's charges,8 the General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that the Saturn
Agreement did not hinder the newly hired workers' right to
freely choose labor representation in a noncoercive setting.9
The General Counsel stressed that labor's immediate involve-
Teamsters, Local 633 v. NLRB, 509 F.2d 490, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Although
§ 8(a)(1) is generally interpreted as requiring no evidence of wrongful motive,
see NLRB v. Litho Press of San Antonio, 512 F.2d 73, 76 (5th Cir. 1975) (section
8(a)(1) is concerned with effect of employer's conduct, not employer's state of
mind), some critics claim that courts implicitly examine the employer's mo-
tive. See Hamilton, NLRB Proscription On Granting of Benefits During Elec-
tion Campaigns-A Detriment to Employees, 1981 ARiz. ST. L.J. 723, 727
(Supreme Court analyzed employer's anti-union animus in § 8(a)(1) suit).
The comparable provision for unions, § 8(b)(1), states that it is an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization "to restrain or coerce.., employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [§ 7]." The Board and courts, in keep-
ing with Congress's perceived intentions, limit the scope of § 8(b)(1) to union
tactics involving violence, intimidation, reprisals, or threat of reprisals. See
NLRB v. Drivers Local Union 639, 362 U.S. 274, 290 (1960).
Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA prohibits an employer from "dominat[ing] or
interfer[ing] with the formation or administration of any labor organization or
contribut[ing] financial or other support to it." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982).
Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA prohibits an employer from "discriminat[ing] in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employ-
ment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982). The comparable provision for unions, § 8(b)(2), pro-
hibits a labor organization from "caus[ing] or attempt[ing] to cause an em-
ployer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3)."
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1982).
8. The General Counsel refused to issue an unfair labor practice com-
plaint. Any person or organization may file an unfair labor practice charge
with the appropriate regional director of the National Labor Relations Board.
29 C.F.R. § 102.9 (1986). Normally, the regional director determines whether a
claim concerning an unfair labor practice has merit and on that basis issues or
declines to issue an unfair labor practice complaint. See 29 C.F.R. § 101.2 (1986)
(initiation of unfair labor practice cases); 29 C.F.R. § 101.4 (1986) (investigation
of charges). The regional office investigates the charge and, in cases involving
novel or complex issues, seeks the counsel of the Division of Advice, a branch
of the General Counsel's staff. Note, Developments in the Law-The Taft-Hart-
ley Act, 64 HARV. L. REV. 781, 786 (1951); see also 29 C.F.R. § 101.8 (1986) (com-
plaints); 29 C.F.R. § 101.4 (1986) (investigation of charges); NLRB v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 141-42 (1975) (General Counsel decides issue sub-
mitted and communicates decision in advice memorandum). The regional di-
rector then follows the instructions in the advice memorandum. Based on the
advice memorandum, the director will dismiss the charge or issue a complaint.
See 29 C.F.R. § 101.8 (1986) (issuance of a complaint); 29 C.F.R. § 101.5 (1986)
(withdrawal of charges); 29 C.F.R. § 101.6 (1986) (dismissal of charges and ap-
peals to General Counsel). If the regional director finds that the claim has
merit, the General Counsel will prosecute the charge on behalf of the party
and the NLRB. See 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 1618-21 (C. Morris 2d ed.
1983).
9. See Advice Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1190 ("[lit is not a foregone
conclusion that employees will be actually represented by the UAW .... [I]f
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ment in the Saturn plant was contingent on providing employ-
ees the opportunity to choose representation prior to full
production. 10
The Saturn Agreement exemplifies management and la-
bor's new attitude toward industrial relations. For the past ten
years, foreign business has demonstrated that cooperative labor
relations can enhance productivity.1 1 Heeding this lesson,
the UAW does not obtain the free support of a majority of Saturn unit employ-
ees, the UAW will not be their collective bargaining representative.").
The General Counsel conditioned the legality of the Saturn Agreement
upon majority approval by the hired Saturn employees, concluding that the
agreement alone did not establish that the parties were functioning in a collec-
tive bargaining relationship. See Advice Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1191;
see also infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text. The General Counsel relied
on the principle established in Houston Division of Kroger Co., 219 N.L.R.B.
388 (1975), to support its finding that the parties had not entered a collective
bargaining agreement. For full discussion of Kroger, see infra notes 59-60 and
accompanying text.
A party may appeal the regional director's decision directly to the General
Counsel, even if the regional director's decision is based on the Office of Ad-
vice memorandum. See 29 C.F.R. § 101.8 (1986) (issuance of a complaint); 29
C.F.R. § 101.5 (1986) (withdrawal of charges); 29 C.F.R. § 101.6 (1986) (dismis-
sal of charges and appeals to General Counsel). The Foundation appealed the
Regional Director's decision, and on November 17, 1986, the General Counsel
affirmed the finding of the Office of Advice, dismissing the Foundation's ap-
peal. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 221, at E-6 (Nov. 17, 1986) (available on
LEXIS).
The courts have interpreted 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) and § 160(b) to grant unre-
viewable discretion to the General Counsel in determining whether an unfair
labor practice exists. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) states: "The General Counsel... shall
have final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the investigation of
charges and issuance of complaints under section 160 of this title ... ." See
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967) (General Counsel's refusal to institute
an unfair labor practice complaint was unreviewable); NLRB v. Pincus Bros.,
Inc.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 386 (3d Cir. 1980) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (General
Counsel's determination was unreviewable); Haleston Drug Stores v. NLRB,
187 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir.) (Board's authority to investigate and issue charges
is invested in General Counsel), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951); Peck, A Pro-
posal to End NLRB Deferral to the Arbitration Process, 60 WASH. L. REV. 355,
376 (1985) (General Counsel's decision is generally unreviewable).
10. See infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
11. See Ken'ichi, The Competition Principle in Japanese Companies and
Labor Unions, 31 JAPAN Q. 25, 25-26 (1984) (stating Japan's success rests in
loyalty of workers who are assured that management will lay them off only in
a rare circumstance). One writer suggests that increased productivity results
from Japan's allegiance to higher quality products, which in turn requires
greater participation from workers. See Weinberg, Cooperation Broke Out and
Is Here to Stay, 35 PROC. OF N.Y.U. THIRTY-FIFTH ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 117,
118-19 (1983). See generally Guest, Participation: Why the Interest?, in PUT-
TING PARTICIPATION INTO PRACTICE 11-13 (1979) (suggesting increased produc-
tivity results from the use of untapped intellectual potential of increasingly
better educated workers, the delegation of control to workers immediately ca-
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United States management has initiated a variety of coopera-
pable of handling unpredictable problems, and the lessening of industrial con-
flict which results from joint decision making).
U.S. Department of Labor statistics show that between 1976 and 1982, the
United States consistently outranked Japan and Germany in the number of
working days lost due to work stoppages.
Working days lost U.S. Japan Germany
(in thousands)
1976 23,962 3254 534
1977 21,258 1518 24
1978 23,774 1357 4281
1979 20,409 930 483
1980 20,844 1001 128
1981 16,908 554 58
1982 9061 538 15
U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, Work Stoppages, Workers Involved, and Worktime
Los 14 Countries, 1955-83, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS BULL. 2217, Table
138, at 447-49 (June 1985). Coupled with statistics on labor output, the num-
bers indicate that one explanation of the decline in U.S. productivity in rela-
tion to its competitors is that labor strikes and unrest cause a slowdown in
general output.
Output per hour U.S. Japan Germany
[1977=100]
1976 97.5 93.3 96.1
1977 100.0 100.0 100.0
1978 100.8 107.9 102.5
1979 101.5 117.4 107.4
1980 101.7 128.6 108.8
1981 105.3 135.7 111.4
1982 106.5 146.8 113.3
U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, Indexes of Output per Hour, Hourly Compensation.
Unit Labor Costs, and Related Measures for Manufacturing, Selected Coun-
tries, 1950-83, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS BULL. 2217, Table 129, at 425
(June 1985).
The cooperative labor relations model evident in some foreign countries
has influenced American labor relations. See, e.g., St. Antoine, Legal Barriers
to Worker Participation in Management Decision Making, 58 TUL. L. REV.
1301, 1317 & nn.71-72 (1984) (attributing change in American management's
attitude to alarm over worker unrest and glowing accounts of Japanese success
with similar programs); Sims & Dean, Beyond Quality Circles: Self-Managing
Teams, 62 PERSONNEL, Jan. 5, 1985, at 25, 25 (Japanese success with quality cir-
cles stimulated American management's interest); Batt & Weinberg, Labor-
Management Cooperation Today, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1978, at 96, 101
(labor-management committees in the steel industry grew out of the crisis
caused by Japanese and German competition). Cf. Address by Prof. John T.
Dunlop of Harvard University on Legal Framework of Industrial Relations in
the United States, DAILY LAB. REP., No. 194 at E-1, E-3 (Oct. 7, 1985) (available
on LEXIS) ("Many factors, of course, influence our economic performance
.... [W]ith aggregate labor costs constituting two-thirds total, it is fully appro-
priate to look critically at performance at the work place. A national indus-
trial relations system that exalts the litigious ... [is] a millstone around our
economic neck.").
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tive labor-management ventures.12 Faced with diminishing
membership,13 labor organizations have likewise become in-
creasingly receptive to cooperative ventures, partly because
such changes heighten labor's attractiveness to workers.14 The
Saturn Agreement is the next step in this development of man-
agement and labor relations. 5 Under this new type of coopera-
12. According to officials, early attempts to use Japanese techniques at
three U.S. auto plants, Nissan, Honda, and New United Motors Manufacturing,
Inc., have proven successful because of employee participation in decision
making, teamwork, and job security. See Report on Japanese-Style Manage-
ment at U.S. Plants, 122 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 208, 208 (July 28, 1986); see
also infra notes 16-18, 63-69 and accompanying text.
Those engaged in the development of the Saturn facility examined the
structure of foreign plants before developing Saturn. See How Power will be
Balanced on Saturn's Shop Floor, Bus. WK., Aug. 5, 1985, at 65, 66. Cf Wein-
berg, supra note 11, at 119-20 (faced with foreign competition and changes in
technology, management and labor have planned for survival and recovery
through cooperation).
13. Union membership has steadily declined in the last thirty years, as the
following statistics indicate:
Year Ratio of Union Membership to
Nonagricultural Workforce
1945 35%
1954 35%
1965 less than 30%
1980 just over 20%
Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1769, 1771 (1983). This decline in union
membership may be the result of a recent change in employee attitude. Not-
ing this change, Edward B. Miller, past chairman of the NLRB, states: "To-
day's employee is not in love with either unions or employers. He or she is
interested in his or her individual future." Miller, The National Labor Rela-
tions Board: From 1970 and Into the Future, 15 STETSON L. REV. 21, 27 (1985).
In 1984 the Consumer Population Survey reported that 15.6% of the private
sector wage and salary workers were union members. Weiler, Milestone or
Tombstone: The Wagner Act at Fifty, 23 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 3 n.4 (1986). Cf.
Note, New Standards for Domination and Support Under Section 8(a)(2), 82
YALE L.J. 510, 517 & nn.53-56 (1973) (discussing worker disinterest in class
struggle).
14. Workers increasingly are focusing on protection of a business's "long
range ability to provide a solid future" rather than immediate wage increases.
Fischer, New Challenges for Labor and Management Achieving a Cooperative
Climate, 35 PROC. OF N.Y.U. THIRTY-FIFTH ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 89, 89-92
(1983). This shift in interest has led workers to support cooperative programs
that substitute greater decision-making input and profit sharing for wage in-
creases. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text; When Employees Run
Their Own Steel Mill, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 7, 1984, at 77. Unions
have begun negotiating with labor's new interests in mind. See Bradley &
Gelb, Employee Buyouts of Troubled Companies, HARv. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct.
1985, at 121, 127 (local unions support employee ownership despite its adverse
effects on employment and wage levels).
15. The Saturn Agreement involves labor in the planning and develop-
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tion, management forms a long-term partnership with labor
and engages labor's input in the early stages of planning, deci-
sion making, and development.16 Early cooperation allows
management to tap into labor expertise on decisions concerning
the plant's functioning and design 17 and establishes a harmoni-
ous climate for future negotiations.' 8
Despite the merits of cooperative ventures, however, the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) threatens to inhibit the
new spirit of cooperation in labor-management relations.' 9 As
ment stages of plant operation. See Whiteside, GM's Bold Bid to Reinvent the
Wheel, Bus. WK., Jan. 21, 1985, at 34, 34-35 (GM "invited the UAW at the start
to help design the car, lay out the plant, and set up production equipment");
see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
16. Other cooperative ventures in which a union became involved in deci-
sion making prior to the hiring of workers include New United Motor Manu-
facturing, Inc., a GM-Toyota plant in Fremont, California, and an LTV Steel
Company plant in Cleveland, Ohio. Hoerr, The NLRB Strikes a Blow for
Worker Participation, Bus. WK., June 16, 1986, at 36. The UAW also antici-
pates early representation at a Toyota plant to be constructed in Georgetown,
Kentucky; a Mazda Motor Company plant to be built near Detroit, Michigan;
and a Mitsubishi-Chrysler plant planned for Peoria, Illinois. Id. The United
Mine Workers, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, and man-
agement at American Motors (before its merger with Chrysler) and other GM
facilities also have voiced interest in creating Saturn-type agreements. See
Maynard, A Labor Deal That Clears Way for GM's Saturn, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Aug. 5, 1985, at 22. Foreign countries also have experimented
with worker participation in early research and development. See, e.g., How-
ard, UTOPIA. Where Workers Craft New Technology, TECH. REV., Apr. 1985,
at 42, 42-43 (Swedish printing unions, systems designers, and scientists are en-
gaged in research effort to design new computerized equipment for printing
industry). One labor expert asserts that, despite the lack of publicity, some la-
bor input into preliminary decisions, such as plant site, must occur at present
within cooperative programs. See Weinberg, supra note 11, at 119.
17. The UAW aided GM in the design of the work system at Saturn. See
Hoerr, supra note 16, at 36. Similarly, other labor unions have helped design
plant layouts in relocation and expansion situations. See Batt & Weinberg,
supra note 11, at 96, 98.
18. National leadership in labor unions and industry management often
develop a relationship from past negotiations which they consider beneficial to
maintain. Letter from Karin Green, Director of Labor Resource Service, AFL-
CIO, to the author (January 15, 1987) (available at Minnesota Law Review).
19. See generally Fulmer & Coleman, Do Quality-of-Work-Life Programs
Violate Section 8(a)(2)?, 35 LAB. L.J. 675, 676 (1984) (members of labor move-
ment question legality of quality-of-work-life programs under § 8(a)(2));
Craver, The Vitality of the American Labor Movement in the Twenty First
Century, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 633, 692-93 (worker ownership programs can
raise questions of § 8(a)(2) violations). In light of the trend in United States
industry towards innovative projects, the United States Department of Labor
recently began a study of the power of national labor laws and bargaining tra-
ditions to inhibit greater cooperation between management and labor. See gen-
erally BUREAU OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND COOPERATIVE
19871
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the Foundation's claims concerning the Saturn plant suggest,
the right of individual employees to choose a labor representa-
tive may conflict with management's need for union recogni-
tion and input in the early stages of a project's development.20
The General Counsel's decision attempted to accommodate
both early cooperation and worker autonomy 21 through an ex-
pansive interpretation of labor precedent. 22
This Comment examines the General Counsel's analysis of
workers' voting and organizing rights under the Saturn Agree-
ment. Part I describes the individual worker's legal right to
choose representation and outlines the types of cooperative
ventures with which management and labor are currently ex-
perimenting. Part II sets out the General Counsel's analysis of
the Saturn Agreement. Part III analyzes whether the General
Counsel's treatment of the Saturn Agreement provides ade-
quate protection to workers and argues that Saturn-type agree-
ments do not preclude workers from exercising their
representation rights as long as those rights are properly safe-
guarded by the NLRB. The Comment concludes that the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board must encourage cooperative
ventures in early plant development to promote industrial
stability.
PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PuB. No. 113, U.S. LABOR LAW AND THE FU-
TURE OF LABoR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION (1987).
20. An early agreement between management and labor could be con-
strued as a violation of § 8(a)(3), which strictly prohibits discrimination in
favor of or against union employees with regard to hiring, see supra note 7 and
accompanying text, and as a violation of § 8(a)(2), which prohibits employer
dominance of a union, see supra note 7 and accompanying text; infra note 78.
21. The desire for early cooperation normally does not threaten worker
autonomy. As several experts have noted, workers and management usually
do not address the issues of wages or terms of employment in cooperative ven-
tures. For example, participants treat quality of work life programs as vehi-
cles for communicating other concerns, such as problems of efficiency and
working conditions within the plant. Both management and labor recognize
that the cooperative venture is not a substitute for collective bargaining. Be-
cause cooperative ventures do not take the place of negotiations, the tradi-
tional, autonomous relationship between labor and management should be
maintained. See Fulmer and Coleman, supra note 19, at 678-79; Moberly,
Worker Participation and Labor-Management Cooperation Through Collective
Bargaining, 15 STETSON L. REV. 99, 109 (1985).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 88-102.
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I. INDIVIDUAL WORKER RIGHTS AND
COOPERATIVE VENTURES
The NLRA promotes stability in labor relations23 by pro-
tecting the individual worker's right to choose a labor represen-
tative.24 Because stability in labor relations also develops when
workers freely choose to assert their rights as a collective
unit,25 protection of the collective bargaining process at times
supercedes the interests of particular individuals. The new co-
operative ventures potentially threaten both the employee's in-
dividual and collective rights. Various legal safeguards have
therefore been developed to protect the employee's interests.
A. AN INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE
REPRESENTATION
An employee's individual and collective rights are pro-
tected in various ways. Section 7 of the NLRA ensures worker
autonomy by guaranteeing the employee's right to join or re-
frain from joining a union26 without coercion from union or
23. The National Labor Relations Act charges the NLRB with the duty of
administering the Act in a fair and expeditious manner. See Farmer, Transfer
of NLRB Jurisdiction Over Unfair Labor Practices to Labor Courts, 88 W. VA.
L. REV. 1, 4 (1985). Congress vested control in the NLRB over representation
proceedings and review of unfair labor practices, including pre-election vio-
lence, failure to bargain to impasse, and other acts which disturb labor-man-
agement relations. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1982). Protection of the collective
bargaining process is thought to promote industrial peace and stability. See 79
CONG. REc. 7672 (1935) (statement of Sen. Walsh) ("What [the Wagner Act]
does is seek to prevent strikes brought on as a result of the employer refusing
to recognize and bargain collectively with the properly designated representa-
tives of his employees.").
24. In passing the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) in 1935,
Congress stated:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate
the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of com-
merce ... by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bar-
gaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing ....
Wagner Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, 449-50 (1935) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1982)).
25. The pervasiveness of this theory throughout other Board policies sup-
ports the view that workers are best protected when their interests are en-
tirely divorced from those of management. See, e.g., Wirtz, The New National
Labor Relations Board. Herein of 'Employer Persuasion', 49 Nw. U.L. REV.
594, 614 (1954) (suggesting that employers who promise benefits have undue
influence over the election process and should be restricted).
26. Section 7 of the NLRA states:
Employees shall have the right to self organization, to form, join, or
1987]
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management.27 The labor union seeking to represent a group of
employees must demonstrate that it has obtained approval
from a majority of the bargaining unit28 through an election or
card count.29 The NLRB limits the bargaining unit to a group
of employees who share a "community of interests" concerning
employment.30 In determining whether employees share a
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
27. See, e.g., General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (1948) (election set
aside due to employer's anti-union speech that "impaired [the] employee's
freedom of choice"), enforced, 192 F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1951), cert denied, 343
U.S. 904 (1952).
28. The bargaining unit is the designated unit from which the union must
obtain majority support to become the collective bargaining representative of
the employees. The NLRA provides that: "Representatives designated or se-
lected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employ-
ees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit." 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
In the absence of agreement between the employer and the organizing work-
ers, the Board will determine the appropriate bargaining unit. See id.; cf.
NLRB v. J.J. Collins' Sons, Inc., 332 F.2d 523 (7th Cir. 1964) (unambiguous and
specific agreement between employer and workers took precedence over
Board discretion in determining appropriate bargaining unit).
29. A card count is a procedure by which signatures on union authoriza-
tion cards (indicating a desire for union representation) are collected from em-
ployees and compared with the employees' signatures on the payroll to
determine authenticity. 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 8, at 489.
If a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit voice support
for the union through a card count, the employer may voluntarily enter into
bargaining with the union. See, e.g., San Clemente Publishing Corp., 167
N.L.R.B. 6, 7 (1967) (bargaining order supported by unofficial poll of employ-
ees agreed to by union and employer to determine majority status), enforced,
408 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1969). An employer who voluntarily agrees to recognize
a union must, however, take "reasonable steps to verify union claims" to avoid
a charge of unlawful dominance or support of a minority union. International
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 739 (1961). An em-
ployer may lawfully refuse to recognize a union on the basis of a card count, in
which case the Board will hold an election. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,
395 U.S. 575, 580 (1969) (upholding the employer's refusal to bargain on the
grounds that card counts were inherently unreliable).
30. 3 NLRB ANN. REP. 174 (1938). The rationale for the "community of
interests" concept rests in the theory that the chosen representative must ne-
gotiate for the mutual benefit of all employees. See J. ABODERLY, R. HAMMER
& A. SANDLER, THE NLRB AND THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNrr 12
(1981). If workers' interests were dissimilar, the representative would be
forced to bargain for several different sets of interests. Assuming that the task
of pleasing everyone would ultimately become impossible, the arrangement
would lead to dissatisfaction. Id. at 12.
Section 9(a) of the NLRA requires only that the unit be "appropriate" for
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community of interests, the Board examines numerous factors,
including the work structure of all the facilities to be included
in the unit, the duties and benefits provided to the employees,
and the interests and practices already present in the indus-
try.3 ' The Act does not require, however, that collective bar-
gaining be confined to the election unit. For example, several
units may negotiate jointly with an employer.32
After establishment of the bargaining unit, election of a
union representative is usually required.33 The election envi-
collective bargaining;, it need not be the best unit for bargaining purposes. See
29 U.S.C. § 159 (1982). Section 9(b) refers to the unit as "employer unit, craft
unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof." 29 U.S.C. § 159(a),(b) (1982). See Mo-
rand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409, 418 (1950) ("There is nothing in the
statute which requires that the unit for bargaining be the only appropriate
unit, or the ultimate unit, or the most appropriate unit; the Act requires only
that the unit be 'appropriate."' (emphasis in original)), enforced in part, 190
F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1951), aff'd, 204 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 940 (1954).
31. Working conditions include pay, benefits, work hours, work per-
formed, and qualifications needed. The Board will also consider similarities
among the facilities, functional integration of the firm, the firm's supervisory
and organizational structures, and physical proximity of the sites. The Board
also studies the bargaining history at the facilities, employees' desires, and the
extent of union organization. See Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L.
REV. 353, 383 (1984); see also J. ABODERLY, R. HAMMER & A. SANDLER, supra
note 30, at 11-83.
32. See Leslie, supra note 31, at 381. In the auto industry, for instance,
although each plant is treated as a separate "election" unit, the NLRB has
long recognized that the UAW may negotiate as a companywide "bargaining"
unit. See General Motors Corp. (Cadillac Motor), 120 N.L.R.B. 1215, 1217
(1958) ("[I]n consequence of this long history of collective bargaining and the
exclusive recognition accorded the UAW by GM on a multiplant unit basis,
there now exists a single companywide bargaining unit embracing all those
plants of the company in which the UAW has in the past been recognized
.... "). Acknowledging that the UAW had been the almost exclusive organizer
of GM employees, the NLRB in General Motors Corp. (Cadillac Motor) noted
that the UAW won this right through 120 successive single plant elections and
was certified as representative in each plant as a single bargaining unit. See id.
at 1217. The Board further acknowledged that the UAW lawfully negotiated a
single nationwide contract to which supplements containing the specific con-
cerns of the local unit were attached. See id. Likewise, the designation of a
particular bargaining unit is tied to a set of jobs or job classifications, not to a
particular group of workers. See A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASEs AND
MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 279 (1986).
33. To determine whether an election is appropriate and necessary, the
NLRB will conduct a preliminary investigation upon the filing of a representa-
tion petition by an employee. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1982); 29 C.F.R.
§ 102.60. In this investigation the NLRB will determine whether the em-
ployer's operations are within NLRB jurisdiction, whether the appropriate
bargaining unit has been designated, whether the employer has declined to
voluntarily recognize the union, whether the petition is timely, and whether
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ronment must be free from coercive activity.3 4 Typically, the
NLRB reasons that unfair labor practices3 5 or conduct dis-
rupting the "laboratory conditions" of the election setting 6 im-
pose a coercive atmosphere upon an election.3 7
the union has garnered support from a minimum of 30% of the employees. See
R. WILLIAMS, NLRB REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDuCT 6-9 (rev. ed. 1985). If
these factors are met, the NLRB will establish a date for the election to be
conducted, generally 30 days following the decision. See id. at 11-12.
34. See General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948) ("In election pro-
ceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a laboratory in which an experi-
ment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to
determine the uninhibited desires of the employees."), enforced, 192 F.2d 504
(6th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 904 (1952). Section 9(c) of the NLRA gov-
erns the duties of the Board regarding elections. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1982).
The Board has established formal procedures for implementing and con-
ducting elections upon the petition of a union, employee, or employer to deter-
mine whether a labor union is entitled to recognition in collective bargaining.
See 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.60-.82 (1986) (Board's rules and regulations); 29 C.F.R.
§§ 101.17-.25 (1986) (statements of procedure).
35. Section 8 of the NLRA defines conduct which will be regarded as an
unfair labor practice. Section 8(a) outlines prohibited employer activities;
§ 8(b) refers to conduct of labor organizations. See supra note 7 and accompa-
nying text.
An unfair labor practice is presumptive evidence that the employees did
not freely choose representation. See Caron Int'l, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 1120, 1120
(1979) (rebutting presumption). The Board, as a general rule, will direct a new
election whenever an unfair labor practice occurs, unless "the violations are
such that it is virtually impossible to conclude that they could have affected
the results of the election." Super Thrift Markets, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 409, 409
(1977). The determination will be based on the number of violations, their se-
verity, the extent of dissemination, the size of the unit, and other factors. Id.
36. The Board described its duty in General Shoe Corp. as "provid[ing] a
laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted under conditions as
nearly ideal as possible." General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. at 127. The Board
stated further that "conduct that creates an atmosphere which renders im-
probable a free choice will sometimes warrant invalidating an election, even
though that conduct may not constitute an unfair labor practice .... ." Id. at
126.
37. The NLRB has strictly restricted employer and union speeches,
leafletting, and campaign activities in the period immediately preceeding an
election to eliminate subliminal coercion. For example, the NLRB restricts
employers from delivering "required attendance" speeches to groups of em-
ployees within 24 hours of an election. See Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B.
427, 429 (1953).
The NLRB provides two remedies for coercive activity. In cases involving
unfair labor practices or conduct that disrupts "laboratory conditions," the
Board may set aside the election and order a new election. NLRB, NLRB
CASE HANDLING MANUAL 11,436 (1984); see also 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW, supra note 8, at 86. In extraordinary cases involving unfair labor prac-
tices so severe that their impact on the workers makes the probability of a fair
second election virtually impossible, the Board may order the employer to bar-
gain with the labor representative without the benefit of a representation elec-
tion. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 580 nn.1-3, 588 (1969)
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To ensure a coercion-free environment, the Board restricts
the premature recognition of a union if the recognition may in-
fluence the election process.38 The United States Supreme
Court has held that an employer's early recognition of a union
representative "taints" an election by giving the union "a
marked advantage over any other in securing the adherence of
employees." 39 Regardless of an employer's good faith belief
that the union represents a majority of the employees, an em-
ployer violates the NLRA by recognizing a union which has not
acquired approval from a majority of the workers.40
Similarly, the Board restricts the employer's grant of bene-
fits that may affect the employee's freedom of choice for or
against unionization.4i In NLRB v. Exchange Parts Corp.,4 the
Supreme Court found that employees implicitly understand
(employer ordered to bargain when it gave impression that union election
would lead to the closing of plant).
38. See Ravenswood Elec. Corp., 232 N.L.R.B. 609, 618 (1977) (employer
recognition of union that did not represent uncoerced majority violated
§ 8(a)(1) and (a)(2) of NLRA); Northrop Corp., 187 N.L.R.B. 172, 207 (1970)
(signing and giving effect to collective bargaining contract was unfair labor
practice because competing union's claim to recognition raised question of rec-
ognized union's majority status).
39. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731,
738 (1961) (quoting Labor Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S.
261, 267 (1938)).
40. Id at 738-39. The Supreme Court found the argument that there was
subsequent approval from a majority irrelevant, because the earlier recogni-
tion effectively denied the employees' right to choose a representative in a free
setting. Id. at 736. The Board has enforced International Ladies' Garment
Workers', but has also attempted to mitigate any penalty against innocent vio-
lators of the premature recognition doctrine by permitting an employer to re-
pudiate a premature recognition of a union through timely and unambiguous
publication of the repudiation. See Kroger Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 1478, 1480 (1985)
(employer cured violation by withdrawing recognition, rescinding contract,
and informing employees shortly after premature recognition).
41. An employer may not benefit one of two rival unions. See, e.g., Ralco
Sewing Indus., Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 438, 445 (1979) (employer soliciting applicants
from favored union); Ravenswood Elec. Corp., 232 N.L.R.B. at 618 (employer
allowing only favored union to organize employees on company property and
company time); Shreveport Packing Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 498, 501-02 (1972) (em-
ployer soliciting employees and threatening to close plant if favored union lost
election); Northrop Corp., 187 N.L.R.B. at 207 (employer notifying workers of
holiday and retroactive pay arrangements conditioned on favored union's ne-
gotiations prior to election). An employer also violates § 8(a)(2) by forming or
urging its employees to form a company union. See, e.g., Miller Materials Co.,
244 N.L.R.B. 496, 499 (1979) (encouraging formation of employee committee by
threatening to withhold wage increases for a year violated § 8(a)(2)); G.Q. Sec.
Parachutes, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 508, 516 (1979) (granting benefits through an
employees' committee to discourage support for an independent union violated
§ 8(a)(2)); World Wide Press, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 346, 368 (1979) (reestablishing
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that benefits they have begun to rely on as compensation may
be removed at the employer's discretion.43 When applying Ex-
change Parts, the Board focuses on whether the grant of bene-
fits is reasonably calculated to influence the employees' vote in
the election.44 The timing of the grant is particularly relevant
to the Board's inquiry.45
Despite the typical reliance on elections as clear proof of
the workers' choice of representative,4 6 elections occasionally
are preempted by an established bargaining relationship be-
tween a labor union and employer. According to the Board, the
stability created by the collective bargaining relationship may
outweigh the possibility of detriment to the individual
worker.47 Frequently, these situations involve successorships,
relocations, and accretions. In each, newly hired workers are
an employee organization, facilitating and promoting its efforts, and promising
benefits contingent on selecting the organization violated § 8(a)(2)).
42. 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
43. Id. at 409 (underlying danger of a grant of benefits is the "suggestion
of a fist inside the velvet glove").
44. Red's Express, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1154, 1155 (1984); see also St. Francis
Hospital, 263 N.L.R.B. 834, 837 (1982) (wage increase calculated to erode union
support was unlawful), enforced sub nom. St. Francis Fed'n Nurses & Health
Professionals v. NLRB, 729 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Tressler Lutheran Home
for Children, 263 N.L.R.B. 651, 663 (1982) (promises of raises if employees
voted against the union violated § 8(a)(1)); Service Spring Co., 263 N.L.R.B.
812, 817 (1982) (improvements in working conditions during union drive vio-
lated § 8(a)(1)).
45. For example, the Board would not construe a wage increase that was
routinely rewarded every six months as a violation. See Gerkin Co., 279
N.L.R.B. No. 136, slip op. at 2 (June 25, 1986) ("[E]mployer must grant or with-
hold benefits 'as he would if a union were not in the picture."' (quoting Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 27, 29 (1967))). Normally, the Board
will proscribe the granting of benefits from the time that the election is or-
dered to the time it is carried out, a period of about 70 days. See Hamilton,
supra note 7, at 725.
46. The Supreme Court has held that an employer faced with a demand
for recognition by a labor organization has the right to insist upon an election
as a means of determining a labor representative's majority status, provided
the employer has not unfairly disrupted the election process. See Linden
Lumber Div. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 310 (1974) (in absence of an unfair labor
practice, union has burden of invoking Board's election procedure when em-
ployer refuses recognition based on authorization cards); NLRB v. Gissel Pack-
ing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 609-10 (1969) (where employer's refusal to recognize and
bargain is based on desire to dissipate union support rather than good faith
doubt of majority status, Board may issue bargaining order without requiring
an election).
47. See Harte & Co., 278 N.L.R.B. No. 128, slip op. at 10-11 (Mar. 13, 1986)
(national labor policy favoring achievement of industrial stability through col-
lective bargaining process supported upholding existing relationship). But see
NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 406 U.S. 272, 306 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
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protected by the continuity of the bargaining unit.48 When ana-
lyzing the fairness to new workers, the Board asks whether the
current members of the bargaining unit or the transferring
workers share the interests of newly hired workers.4 9 Similar-
ity of interests ensures that the new workers' interests were ad-
equately represented in any preceding negotiations.50
For example, when a successor employer hires a majority
of employees from a largely unchanged bargaining unit,51 the
new employer must recognize the union representative if the
successor operation is substantially similar to the predecessor
operation.52 The presence of a majority of workers from the
old work force satisfies the Board that leadership elected by the
old bargaining unit also represents the interests of the new
senting) (industrial peace would be produced at the expense of employees'
wishes, which the Act seeks to preserve).
48. See NLRB v. Jeffries Lithograph Co., 752 F.2d 459, 468-69 (9th Cir.
1985) ("[T]he period immediately following a change in the employment rela-
tionship ... is the time when employees, both holdovers and new hires, may
need stability in their working environment most. A collective voice can help
them achieve this stability by guarding against sudden changes in terms and
conditions of employment."); see infra notes 53, 56 and accompanying text.
49. See NLRB v. Jeffries Lithograph Co., 752 F.2d at 463-64 (Board will
examine changes in working conditions to determine whether transferring
workers' representative is likely to represent present employees' choice);
Safeway Stores, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 918, 918 (1981) (Board found a valid accre-
tion "when the additional employees share an overwhelming community of in-
terest with the preexisting unit to which they are accreted"). To determine
whether workers share common interests in accretion situations, the Board
considers geographic proximity, interchange of employees, functional integra-
tion of departments, similarity of skills, and responsibilities of employees. Id.
50. See, e.g., Border Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 814, 815 (1973)
(substantial continuity in the nature of employment is significant in determin-
ing whether Board certification of a union is effective with respect to a succes-
sor-employer).
51. The Board will find that the bargaining unit has remained unchanged
if the work terms and type of jobs within the unit remain the same. See, e.g.,
i&i at 815-16; Simmons Eng'g Co., 65 N.L.R.B. 1373, 1377-78 (1946) (operation
unchanged if employer did not alter production methods, organization, or su-
pervisory order).
52. See NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 406 U.S. at 278-79, 281-82 (1972).
The Court held that a successor employer, upon a showing of majority status,
is obligated to recognize the labor representative from the earlier, unchanged
bargaining unit, but is under no duty to adopt the original employer's contract.
Id The Court also noted that it would have been a "wholly different case" if
the Board had determined that the new employer's operational structure dif-
fered from that of the predecessor. I&L at 280.
Enforced recognition precludes newly hired workers from voting on rep-
resentation, but not from influencing the labor representative in negotiating a
new contract. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text; infra notes 54-57
and accompanying text.
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unit.5 3 The new employer, however, need not adopt the previ-
ously negotiated collective bargaining agreement.5
Similarly, when an operation relocates, the employer must
continue to recognize the union representative at the new facil-
ity.55 Unlike a successor employer, however, a relocating em-
ployer must honor an existing collective bargaining agreement
"if the operations at the new facility are substantially the same
as those at the old" and transferees from the old facility consti-
tute a "substantial percentage" of the work force.5 6
Finally, the Board permits an employer and a union to
agree to recognize the union at all future facilities owned by
the employer, conditioned on approval by the new employees.5 7
53. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 406 U.S. at 280-81 (where bargaining
unit was unchanged and a majority of old employees were hired, Board or-
dered employer to bargain with incumbent union).
54. Id. at 291 (setting aside Board's finding of a violation based on conclu-
sion that new employer must accept previously executed collective bargaining
contract); see also Crawford Container, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 851, 859 (1978)
("[S]uccessor employer is free unilaterally to set initial terms on which he will
hire the employees of the predecessor, but he may not refuse to hire the pred-
ecessor's employees.., to avoid having to recognize the union.") (citing NLRB
v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 406 U.S. at 279-82); Spruce Up Corp., 209 N.L.R.B.
194, 195 (1974) (employer free to set initial terms for hiring), enforced, NLRB
v. Spruce Up Corp., 529 F.2d 516 (4th Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court has also
stated, however, "[There will be instances in which it is perfectly clear that
the new employer plans to retain all of the employees in the unit and in which
it will be appropriate to have him initially consult with the employees' bar-
gaining representative before he fixes terms." NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec.
Servs., 406 U.S. at 294-95.
55. See, e.g., Harte & Co., 278 N.L.R.B. No. 128, slip op. at 6 (Mar. 13, 1986)
(issue rested on whether new facility was operation similar to original).
56. Substantial percentage is approximately 40% or more. Id. The per-
centage will be computed on the "date that the transfer process was substan-
tially completed." Id. at 8. The Board in Harte found that the date on which
the final employee transfer took place was the appropriate time. Id. at 9.
The Board refers to this analysis as involving a "balancing [of] the newly
hired employees' interest in choosing . . . union representation against the
transferees' interest in retaining the fruits of their collective activity." Id. at 9-
10. By permitting the transferees to retain union representation, the Board is
apparently assuming that the new employees' interests are adequately pro-
tected by workers sharing common conditions of employment.
57. Unlike the Saturn facility, the new facilities are now considered to be
part of the existing bargaining unit upon worker approval. See, e.g., Smith's
Management Corp. (Frazier's Market), 197 N.L.R.B. 1156, 1157 (1972) (em-
ployer required to honor a negotiated future facilities provision where new
employees accreted to the existing unit); U.S. Rubber Co. (Elkhart, Ind.), 109
N.L.R.B. 1293, 1294-95 (1954) (Board ordered a self-determination election to
determine whether a newly opened warehouse should be included in a multi-
warehouse bargaining unit). Given industry practices and prior rulings of the
NLRB, however, the Saturn facility would not be considered part of a larger,
industry-wide bargaining unit. See supra note 32 and accompanying text; infra
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Traditionally, the agreement, referred to as an accretion clause,
applied only to facilities within the same bargaining unit.58 In
Houston Division of Kroger Co.,5 9 however, the Board similarly
analyzed the accretion of future facilities not within the same
bargaining unit. The Board held in Kroger Co. that an em-
ployer may agree to waive its right to demand an election to de-
termine whether a union has majority support at these future
facilities, as well as those within the same bargaining unit.60
B. COOPERATIVE VENTURES
Although the NLRA separates individual interests from
management interests, 61 cooperative ventures are gaining popu-
note 113 and accompanying text. The Saturn facility will remain a separate
bargaining unit.
58. See Borg-Warner Corp. (UAW), 113 N.L.R.B. 152, 154 (1955) (where
job classifications in new department were substantially the same as in other
operations, newly hired employees constituted an accretion to existing unit),
petition for review denied sub nom International Union, UAW v. NLRB, 231
F.2d 237 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 352 U.S. 908 (1956); Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
(Cleveland, Ohio), 79 N.L.R.B. 744, 745-46 (1948) (employees moved to new po-
sition substantially similar to that covered by existing bargaining unit were au-
tomatically represented by that unit). The NLRB analyzes the relationship
between the existing bargaining unit and newly hired workers to determine
whether they share a "community of interests." See supra note 49 and accom-
panying text; Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134, 137-38 (1962) (af-
firmative showing of differing interests from established unit required to
support request for severance); Potash Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 340, 343 (1955) (com-
pany servicemen who worked in same department under same supervisors in-
cluded within production employee unit). For a discussion of the factors
considered, see supra notes 31, 49 and accompanying text.
59. 219 N.L.R.B. 388 (1975).
60. See id, at 389 (additional store clause in agreement constituted
waiver). The NLRB in Houston Division of Kroger Co. enforced an "accretion
type" clause at a facility that could, under the law, be considered a separate
bargaining unit. Id at 388 (holding that "'additional store clauses' are valid in
situations where the Board is satisfied that the employees affected are not de-
nied their right to have a say in the selection of their bargaining representa-
tive"). The Board also broke from precedent by finding that the second
condition of an accretion clause, approval from newly hired employees, would
be satisfied by a card count or vote subsequent to the agreement. See id. at 388
(finding that card majority conceded to by all parties was valid).
61. See Gross, Conflicting Statutory Purposes: Another Look at Fifty
Years of NLRB Law Making, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 7, 13-14 (1985) (con-
cept of government as neutral guarantor of employees' free choice is inconsis-
tent with the Wagner Act's concept of a government partial to collective
bargaining). The original Wagner Act and the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments
established somewhat inconsistent purposes for the NLRA, indicating that the
conflict between protection of the collective bargaining process and individual
rights is entrenched within the Act itself. See id. at 13-14 (Wagner Act sup-
porters did not envision NLRA as neutral guarantor of employee free choice;
1987]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
larity. Encouraged by the Department of Labor and industrial
relations experts alike,62 management has seized upon coopera-
tive programs as a solution to increased international competi-
tion and unsettling market conditions.63 Cooperative ventures
are prolific and varied,6 4 but typical examples include employee
rather, the Act was intended to promote collective bargaining). Compare 29
U.S.C. § 141 (1982) (no mention of collective bargaining process in Taft-
Hartley amendment to the policy provision of NLRA) with 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1982) (original Wagner Act declaration stating that purpose of the Act is "to
mitigate and eliminate ... obstructions [to commerce] ... by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise
by workers of full freedom of association"). But see K. McGuINEss, THE NEw
FRONTIER NLRB 14 (1963) ("Neither in the original Wagner Act nor in any of
its amendments did Congress express any concern over the protection of labor
organizations as such. Always, its interest has been in the protection of the
individual."). For example, the policy which permits a successor employer to
recognize the union voted on in a prior election precludes any newly hired
workers from exercising their representation rights. At the same time, how-
ever, the policy protects the collective bargaining unit from continuous chal-
lenges. See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
62. Secretary of Labor William E. Brock has stated that the country must
develop a solid atmosphere of cooperation, based on the concept of worker dig-
nity and equality. Address by William Brock, Secretary of Labor, Sixteenth
Constitutional Convention AFL-CIO (Oct. 30, 1985), reprinted in 1985 PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE AFL-CIO
292. Professor John T. Dunlop has likewise stated: "It is widely said by press,
politicians and pundits alike that the economic future of the country, even its
competitive survival, mandates a higher degree of labor-management coopera-
tion or even partnership." J. Dunlop, supra note 11, at E-1.
63. In Japan, management treats labor-management committees as a fun-
damental part of the company structure. Sims & Dean, supra note 11, at 25.
Witnessing Japan's economic success, United States companies have attempted
to emulate Japanese practices to obtain similar success. See id. at 25; supra
notes 11-12 and accompanying text; infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
64. Cooperative ventures vary according to the amount of employee par-
ticipation that is encouraged and management's attitude toward participating
employees. See, e.g., Bradley & Gelb, supra note 14, at 121, 123 (Pan American
employees exchanged a 10% wage cut and fifteen month wage freeze for $35
million in shares and union representation on the board of directors); Labor-
Management Cooperation and Worker Participation: Elements of Program
Development, ARB. J., June 1985, at 67, 68 [hereinafter Labor-Management Co-
operation] (Mass Transit Authority in Flint, Michigan involves workers in pro-
duction level decisions by seeking their advice on purchases of new
equipment.); id. (workers at the Ford plant in Edison, New Jersey, have the
power to stop the assembly line when a problem prevents them from correctly
doing their job); see also Richardson, Courting Greater Employee Involvement
through Participative Management, SLOAN MANAGEMENT REV., Winter 1985,
at 33. Richardson divides the participatory management programs into three
levels. In level one management views employees as passive and focuses on
improving communication and attitudes. In level two management views em-
ployees as active and seeks to involve employees in productivity improvement
and cost management. In level three management views employees as part-
ners and rewards employees' efforts with profit-sharing. Id.
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stock ownership programs, 65 labor membership on the company
board of directors,6 6 labor-management committees,67 agree-
ments to give workers access to management's records,68 and
65. By 1981 one-sixth of the Fortune 500 companies had established em-
ployee stock ownership plans (ESOPs). Rosen, Making Employee Ownership
Work, 2 NAT'L PRODUCTIVITY REv. 13, 15 (1982-1983). Two forms of ESOPs
exist: nonleveraged and leveraged. Companies implementing a nonleveraged
ESOP establish a trust fund for employees into which they contribute stock or
money to buy the stock in the employees' names. A leveraged ESOP is one in
which the employer borrows the money to buy the shares for the employees.
As the debt is paid, the shares are converted to the employees' possession. See
id. at 16. Companies create ESOPs to permit employees to gain ownership
without investing their liquid capital, to provide an employee benefit or retire-
ment plan, to facilitate owner retirement, and to take advantage of the tax in-
centives provided by Congress for participating companies. See id. at 13, 15.
For examples of employee stock ownership plans, see Developments in Indus-
trial Relations, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 1984, at 54, 54 (limited profit-sharing
at GM and Ford); Developments in Industrial Relations, MONTHLY LAB. REV.,
Aug. 1982, at 56, 56 (Crown Zellerbach "gainsharing" plan); Developments in
Industrial Relations, MONTHLY LAB. REV., July 1982, at 53, 53-54 (Interna-
tional Harvester profit-sharing plan); Developments in Industrial Relations,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1982, at 64, 64 (Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp.
preferred stock contribution).
66. Union leaders now sit on the boards of Pan American, Eastern,
Chrysler, and McCreary Tire. Cappelli, Union Gains Under Concession Bar-
gaining, 36 ANN. PRoc. INDuS. REL. RES. A. 297, 301 (1983).
67. Labor-management committees are established for a variety of rea-
sons, including improvement of communication, morale, productivity and work
methods, skills development, work environment, and health and safety condi-
tions. Labor-Management Cooperation, supra note 65, at 68. An estimated
one-third of the Fortune 500 have established employee-management pro-
grams. Wallace & Driscoll, Social Issues in Collective Bargaining, in U.S. IN-
DUSTRIAL RELATIONS 1950-80: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 199, 241 (1981).
The most common form of labor-management committees are quality
circles (QCs) and quality of work life committees (QWLs). Created as small
problem-solving units, QCs normally include a group of workers belonging to
the same department or performing similar work who meet with first-line su-
pervisors to discuss solutions to environmental or production problems. Sims
& Dean, supra note 11, at 25-32. Quality of work life is described as a commit-
ment of management and union to support local activities and experiments
designed to increase employee participation in determining how to improve
work. 1d. at 29. Examples of quality of work life programs include the Ford
plant in Sharonville, Ohio and the Buick Complex in Flint, Michigan.
Copenhaver & Guest, Quality of Worklife: The Anatomy of Two Successes, 2
NAT'L PRODUCTMITY REV., Winter 1982-1983, at 5, 5-12.
68. When workers have been asked to take wage cuts, employers have al-
lowed unions to review company financial records. See generally Gould, Union
Involvement in Employer Decision-Making: Some Reflections on America and
Europe, 58 TUL. L. REV. 1322, 1323-24 (1984) (reviewing agreements granting
the right to inspection of records). Such agreements include the 1983 Basic
Steel Agreement, United Food and Commercial Workers and the Armour Co.
negotiations, River Rouge Steel Co. and Local 600 of the UAW, and Crown
Zellerbach Corp. and the Woodworkers Union. Id.
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programs to assist laid-off employees. 69
Labor representatives have traditionally opposed these
innovative programs.7 0 Unions see their role as negotiators
for employees threatened by the alternative employee-
management relationship.71 Moreover, unions are aware of the
conflicting views of labor and management and question man-
agement's motives in implementing cooperative programs. 72
Despite their skepticism, however, unions have begun to sup-
port cooperative ventures in order to retain present and attract
new membership. 73
69. The auto industry has established programs to retrain and relocate
employees laid off in plant closings, as well as to assist them in searching for
new jobs. See, e.g., Hansen, Innovative Approach to Plant Closings: The UAW-
Ford Experience at San Jose, MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1985, at 34, 35 (joint
management-labor initiative to assist dislocated workers established at Ford
plant); Developments in Industrial Relations, MONTHLY LAB. REv., June 1982,
at 63, 63-64 (preferential hiring program established for laid off automotive
employees of Rockwell International Corporation at company's aerospace
plant).
70. See Levitan & Werneke, Worker Participation and Productivity
Change, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 1984, at 28, 31 (U.S. labor organizations
prefer adversarial relationship); Craver, supra note 19, at 679 (many union
leaders believe cooperative programs create docileness in workers); see also id.
at 694 (some union leaders believe employee ownership programs undermine
worker solidarity and in the case of ESOPs, are instituted by employers in an
effort to diminish worker enthusiasm for unionization); Fischer, supra note 14,
at 100 (unions often hostile to cooperative efforts, fearing the unknown and
new roles); Summers, Worker Participation in the U.S. and West Germany:
A Comparative Study from an American Perspective, 28 AM. J. CoMP. L. 367,
370-71 (1980) (unions emphasize confrontation rather than cooperation); Batt
& Weinberg, supra note 11, at 96 (noting extensive commentary about labor
union hostility in the U.S. towards cooperative programs in other countries).
71. See Cordova, Workers'Participation in Decisions Within Enterprises:
Recent Trends and Problems, INT'L LAB. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 125, 135 (un-
ions fear their roles will be usurped by other forms of worker participation);
cf. Craver, supra note 19, at 674 (labor-management committees could eventu-
ally assume the responsibility of shop stewards and union officials). Manage-
ment can alleviate labor skepticism by explicitly limiting the subjects which
the cooperative program may address. See Labor-Management Cooperation
supra note 64, at 69 (labor-management committees are often explicitly pro-
hibited from handling collective bargaining issues, including grievances).
72. Unions fear that worker participation programs are methods of avoid-
ing fair compensation. See Levitan & Werneke, supra note 70, at 32. See also
Craver, supra note 19, at 674 (unions distrust cooperative ventures as "devices
to increase productivity surreptitiously" and as "union-busting techniques").
Cf. Batt & Weinberg, supra note 11, at 96 (workers "do not wish to be junior
partner[s] in success and senior partner[s] in failure") (quoting Thomas Dona-
hue, executive assistant to the President of the AFL-CIO, in his discussion of
the prevalence of cooperative programs at troubled companies).
73. Batt & Weinberg, supra note 11, at 97 (union leaders endorse labor-
management committees). Unions are "willing to experiment because of their
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Various legal safeguards exist to protect the individual em-
ployee's interests during early cooperative activities. Coopera-
tive ventures require a shift in the power structure of the
company, a change that management is often reluctant to fully
support.7 4 To include employees in meaningful decision mak-
ing, cooperative programs must demand that workers share
more of the decision-making power.7 5 When faced with unfa-
vorable conditions, however, management often reverts to
traditional methods and makes final decisions without em-
ployee influence.7 6 Because of these concerns, the law attempts
to regulate this power balance by requiring that labor and man-
agement have separate representatives throughout the coopera-
tive process.77
Another legal safeguard protects the employee's individual
interests in cooperative ventures. In the initial stages of union
interest in survival and protecting jobs." Weinberg, supra note 11, at 123; cf.
Fischer, supra note 14, at 89 (change in fundamental economic realities will
force unions "to participate in policies designed to promote growth, invest-
ment, productivity, strong competitive positions and whatever else it takes to
assure good, secure jobs capable of providing for the needs of union
members").
74. See Levitan & Werneke, supra note 70, at 32 (worker participation
programs require a redistribution of power but "management in general is
more likely to want workers to 'feel' involved rather than actually to help
make policy").
75. Id, at 28, 32.
76. See Richardson, supra note 64, at 40 (cooperative ventures normally
reach a crisis period when communication falters and management makes uni-
lateral changes without employees' input); see also, Bradley & Gelb, supra
note 14, at 127 (owner-workers at South Bend Lathe were first employees in
the U.S. to strike "against themselves" because of management's refusal to
concede wage increase).
77. The Board and the federal courts protect labor's independence from
management under two provisions of the NLRA. The Board and the federal
courts have evaluated most charges regarding the legality of a cooperative ven-
ture under § 2(5), which defines labor organizations, and § 8(a)(2) and (a)(3),
which discusses employer dominance and support of the labor organization. 29
U.S.C §§ 152(5), 158(a)(2), 158(a)(3) (1982). Section 2(5) defines "labor organi-
zation" as "any organization of any kind, or any agency or any employee repre-
sentation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists
for the purposes, in whole or in part, of dealing with employees concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or condi-
tions of work." NLRA § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1982).
The Board and at least one court have permitted cooperative ventures to
continue by excluding them from this definition. See NLRB v. Streamway
Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982); General Foods Corp.
and American Federation of Grain Millers, 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977). But see
NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82, 84-85 (7th Cir.) (management violated
NLRA by establishing communications committee), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939
(1971); NLRB v. General Shoe Corp., 192 F.2d 504, 507 (6th Cir. 1951) (enforc-
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organizing, the employer's influence is most persuasive and po-
tentially coercive.78 To protect employees' interests during an
organizing drive, the NLRA prohibits an employer or union
from interfering with the right of an employee to either initiate
or refrain from initiating union representation.7 9
ing Board decision that Advisory, Grievance, Safety and Benefit Committee vi-
olated NLRA), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 904 (1952).
If the Board or court determines that a group is a labor organization
under § 2(5), its formation must comply with all provisions of the NLRA, in-
cluding § 8(a)(2) and (a)(3), which prohibits employer dominance, interfer-
ence, or hiring discrimination with regard to that labor organization. See
supra note 7 and accompanying text. See generally Note, Worker Ownership
and Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 91 YALE L.J. 615, 620-
27 (1982); Note, supra note 13, at 511-15.
78. Recognizing that an employer may seek to unduly influence develop-
ing unions, Congress established § 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, which prohibits em-
ployer dominance, interference, and unlawful support. Although often used
interchangeably by the Board and federal courts, these three terms are deline-
ated according to the degree of employer influence.
"Domination" of a union indicates an irreversible subjugation of the union
to the employer's control. Compare Lawson Co., 267 N.L.R.B. 463 (1983) (find-
ing employer unlawfully dominated union when it sponsored election for em-
ployee committee, dictated its purposes, controlled its activities, and bargained
with it in order to avoid dealing with rival union), enforced as modified, 753
F.2d 471 (6th Cir. 1985) with NLRB v. Homemaker Shops, Inc., 724 F.2d 535
(6th Cir. 1984) (refusing to find employer dominance when employees freely
chose committee members, meetings were held without management present,
and negotiators were chosen and proposals made without employer input).
Employer "interference" involves less severe misconduct in which the em-
ployer attempts to influence the union but is not found to have irreparably
damaged the union's autonomy. Common examples of employer interference
include supervisor participation in union activity, see, e.g., Hillside Bus Corp.,
262 N.L.R.B. 1254 (1982), recognition of the union prior to majority authoriza-
tion, see, e.g., International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366
U.S. 731 (1961), and employer-voiced preference for one of two competing un-
ions, see, e.g., Ralco Sewing Indus. Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 438 (1979); Independent
Ass'n of Steel Fabricators, 231 N.L.R.B. 264 (1977), enforcement denied in
part, 582 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1130 (1979).
"Unlawful support" generally refers to employer acts of tangible benefit
to a labor organization that are deemed less severe than dominating actions.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Vernitron Elec. Components, Inc., 548 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1977)
(holding that employer unlawfully supported union when it assembled em-
ployees, organized authorization card signatures, and immediately recognized
union), enforcing 221 N.L.R.B. 464 (1975). The Board and courts have sought
to distinguish unlawful support from permissive cooperation by focusing on
the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the employer's activity
would inhibit employees in their choice of representative and restrict the
union from maintaining arms-length negotiations. NLRB v. Keller Ladders S.,
Inc., 405 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1968), enforcing 161 N.L.R.B. 21 (1966); Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals, Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 322, 325-26 (1976).
79. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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II. THE GENERAL COUNSEL'S MEMORANDUM ON
THE SATURN AGREEMENT
When the Foundation challenged the Saturn Agreement, it
asserted that GM prematurely recognized the UAW and thus
prevented Saturn employees from freely choosing nonunion
status or a different union representative.80 The General Coun-
sel prefaced its analysis of the Foundation's claim by noting
that GM and the UAW were parties to an existing, productive
labor-management relationship.8 ' As such, they had a duty to
negotiate in good faith over management decisions such as the
Saturn venture, which could endanger employees' jobs.82
Emphasizing that the Saturn Agreement was the product
of that existing, productive relationship, the General Counsel
rejected the Foundation's argument that UAW interaction with
GM and GM favoritism toward UAW-affiliated workers in hir-
ing discriminated against non-UAW members.8 3 The General
Counsel found that the Saturn Agreement benefitted all GM
employees working in designated UAW-represented units, re-
gardless of their status as union members.8 4 Because the
Agreement gave a hiring preference to any current GM worker,
nonunion members within UAW-represented units would have
80. Advice Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1189. For a general description
of the Saturn Agreement, see supra notes 2-5.
81. Advice Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1189 ("GM and the UAW have
had a long and productive collective bargaining relationship.").
82. Id The General Counsel initially determined that the Saturn Agree-
ment was a valid product of "effects" bargaining under First Nat'l Mainte-
nance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). As the General Counsel noted,
"effects" bargaining is mandated when an employer's decision will result in
job losses, including layoffs, transfers, and relocations. Advice Memorandum,
supra note 1, at 1189 (citing Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1964)). The
General Counsel found that the success or failure of Saturn may determine
whether other GM plants in the U.S. will be closed, and therefore "effects"
bargaining was necessary. Advice Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1190.
83. Advice Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1189 (preference given to GM
employees represented by the UAW was not unlawful). The basis for the
Foundation's contention is § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982);
see supra note 7 and accompanying text. "Discrimination" under § 8(a)(3) has
a narrower interpretation than the common understanding of the term, refer-
ring exclusively to favoritism or exclusion on the basis of union status. 1 THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 8, at 182-83.
84. Advice Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1190. The General Counsel
conceded that "the preference given to GM employees represented by the
UAW may have some negative impact on the employment prospects of others."
Id It concluded that the NLRA did not prohibit an employer from prefering
its own employees over other applicants. Id at 1191; cf. Courier-Citizen Co. v.
Local 11, 702 F.2d 273, 276 n.4, 277-78 (1st Cir. 1983) (upholding arbitration
award enforcing a preferential hiring agreement between bargaining units of
19871
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
equal access to the Saturn jobs. 5 The Agreement therefore did
not exclude workers on the basis of union membership.8 6 The
preferential hiring provision applied to all members of the se-
lected bargaining units.8 7
The General Counsel next determined that the Agreement
permitted employees to hold an election after hiring was com-
pleted.88 Expanding on Houston Division of Kroger Co., the
General Counsel found that the omission of an express condi-
tion that the UAW obtain majority status did not indicate a lack
an employer). A union may also lawfully obtain this type of benefit for its
members. Local 357 Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 675-76 (1961).
The General Counsel correctly noted that UAW units could not legally ex-
clude nonunion members under §§ 8(a)(3) and 14(b) of the NLRA and state
right-to-work laws. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3), 164(b) (1982). The first proviso
of § 8(a)(3) prohibits an employer from hiring on the basis of union status,
eliminating the earlier practice called the "closed shop." Under a closed shop
agreement, the employer agreed to condition hiring upon union membership.
2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 8, at 1362. The NLRA permits the
union and management, however, to enter into agency shop agreements in
which employees may be required as a condition of employment to obtain, at a
minimum, dues paying union membership within 30 days of hiring. See 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)(1982) ("[N]othing in this [Act] . . . shall preclude an em-
ployer from making an agreement with a labor organization... to require as a
condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day fol-
lowing the beginning of such employment.... ."); see also NLRB v. General
Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963). The exception to § 8(a)(3) is found in § 14(b)
which permits the states to limit agency shop agreements. See NLRA § 14(b),
29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1982) ("Nothing in this [Act] shall be construed as authoriz-
ing the execution ... of agreements requiring membership in a labor organiza-
tion as a condition of employment in any State ... in which such execution...
is prohibited by State . .. law."). States with right-to-work laws permit em-
ployees to work at unionized plants without joining the union, regardless of
the agreement established through collective bargaining. By 1980, 20 states
had statutes or constitutional provisions outlawing agency shop arrangements
and enacting right-to-work laws. 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note
8, at 1392. UAW units in states with right-to-work laws undoubtedly contain
nonunion employees. Therefore, favoritism towards certain UAW units will
include benefits to nonunion workers as well as union members.
85. Advice Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1190. The General Counsel in-
dicated that the Saturn Agreement extended preferential hiring to nonunion
GM workers within UAW-represented units as well as to UAW members. Id.
86. The General Counsel noted that UAW-represented employees who
were not working for a GM unit covered by the Saturn Agreement would not
receive the benefit of a hiring preference. Id. Thus, GM was not favoring
workers because of union membership, but because they were GM employees
in the desired units. Id.
87. Id. ("If an employee is in a unit of employees represented by the
UAW, that employee obtains the preference, irrespective of whether he/she is
actually a member of the Union.").
88. Id. at 1191 ("[T]he Board will read into the agreement the condition
that the UAW must achieve majority status.").
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of intent to comply with the law on the part of GM or the
UAW.8 9 The General Counsel therefore read into the Agree-
ment a condition that the UAW obtain majority status before
full implementation of the Saturn Agreement. 90 The General
Counsel stated that it was an agreement "in futuro, if and when
the UAW achieves majority support."91 Because the Agreement
was conditional, once hired, the workers could accept UAW
leadership, choose a different union representative, or become a
nonunion facility. Finding that the Agreement did not unlaw-
fully interfere with that choice or establish anything more than
a conditional relationship, the General Counsel held that the
remaining evidence was insufficient to show that the parties
had entered into an immediate "functioning collective bargain-
ing relationship." 92
The General Counsel speculated, however, whether GM
and the UAW could have legally entered into an immediate col-
lective bargaining relationship. 93 Discussing a recent relocation
decision,94 the General Counsel reiterated that the Board re-
quires an employer and a union to engage in good faith bargain-
ing when the workers' employment is threatened. 95 The
General Counsel also observed that in NLRB v. Burns Interna-
tional Security Services, Inc.,96 the Court determined that a
new employer has an obligation to bargain with a previously
unionized unit when it is "perfectly clear" that the successor
employer "plans to retain" the employees from the predecessor
unit.97 The General Counsel determined that under the Saturn
relationship, the intention of the employer to hire union em-
89. The Board assumed, as it did in Kroger, that the parties intended their
agreement to be lawful. Id
90. I&
91. 1&L; see also id at 1190 ("lit is not a foregone conclusion that employ-
ees will be actually represented by the UAW.").
92. Id. at 1192.
93. Id at 1191 ("That issue is not free from doubt.").
94. Harte & Co., 278 N.L.R.B. No. 128 (March 13, 1986).
95. Advice Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1191-92. The General Counsel
noted that the Board's approval of prehire recognition in Harte was based on
the parties' obligation to engage in good faith bargaining when workers' em-
ployment is threatened, the substantial number of transferring employees in
the new work force, and national labor policy favoring "industrial stability
achieved through the collective bargaining process." I& (citing Harte & Co.,
278 N.L.R.B. No. 128, slip op. at 11 (March 13, 1986)). While noting that the
same factors were present in the Saturn situation, the General Counsel ac-
knowledged that Harte might be distinguishable, because it involved relocation
of an existing plant, not the establishment of an entirely new facility. Id
96. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
97. 1d at 294-95.
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ployees was "perfectly clear." 98 Not only had GM explicitly
stated its desire to hire UAW workers,9 9 but the UAW workers
had also shown a strong desire to work at Saturn. °0 0 Under
these circumstances, the General Counsel asserted that the
Burns rationale permitted GM's conditional recognition of the
UAW as labor representative. 1 '
Despite its suggestion that Burns was relevant, the General
Counsel refrained from basing its decision on Burns. Although
Burns would permit the NLRB to liberally predict that enough
workers from a previous unit would transfer to the new plant
and thus create a successor plant, the Burns Court did not ad-
dress a situation involving a new election unit, a new plant, and
a different operation. 0 2 Noting that reliance on Burns in the
Saturn situation might be controversial, the General Counsel
reasserted its position that the Agreement itself did not place
the parties in a collective bargaining relationship. 0 3
98. Advice Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1192.
99. Id. ("[T]he Employer has agreed to extend offers of employment so
that a majority of the Saturn workforce will come from the ranks of its own
employees who are now represented by the UAW.").
100. Id. (noting GM-commissioned poll which revealed that 114,000 to
145,250 GM workers would consider working for Saturn Corporation).
The Saturn Agreement also provided a strong incentive for newly hired
Saturn employees to remain affiliated with GM. The Saturn Agreement con-
tained favorable terms of employment, including established wages and work
schedules for part of the work force, and provided an underlying promise of
lateral movement within the industry. See supra note 2 and accompanying
text. GM indicated through the Saturn Agreement itself that it would consult
the UAW when movements of workers from one plant to another occurred.
See Saturn Agreement, supra note 1, at 15 (discussing job security). Provisions
of the Saturn Agreement indicate that 80% of the Saturn employees will be
guaranteed job security. Id. at 14-15. In the event of a layoff or plant closing,
the UAW workers have the advantage of belonging to a union which has a
proven record of successful negotiations with GM, as evidenced by the Agree-
ment itself.
101. Advice Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1192.
102. Id
103. Id. This analysis of the Saturn Agreement was subsequently con-
firmed by the General Counsel's statement that the Agreement did not unlaw-
fully infringe upon the workers' rights. See Letter from NLRB General
Counsel Collyer to National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation on Dis-
missal of Saturn Case, DAILY LAB. REP., (BNA) No. 221, at E-1 (Nov. 17, 1986)
(available on LEXIS); Advice Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1189-91 (discuss-
ing job preference issue).
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III. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. ANALYSIS OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL'S APPROACH TO THE
SATURN AGREEMENT
In its decision the General Counsel unfortunately paid lit-
tle attention to the employees' individual interests. The Gen-
eral Counsel also failed to address the implications of the
Saturn Agreement for nonunion workers. Despite these short-
comings, however, the General Counsel accurately assessed the
Saturn situation when it found that the Agreement was lawful.
1. The Saturn Agreement's Protection of Individual Interests
During Negotations
The General Counsel's opinion represents a subtle shift in
labor policy away from an emphasis on securing individual
rights to an interest in stabilizing labor-management rela-
tions.10 4 The General Counsel relied upon precedents involving
management and unions with existing collective bargaining re-
lationships to demonstrate that UAW leadership from other fa-
cilities acted in the Saturn negotiations as the appropriate
representative for the new Saturn workers.1 0 5 By analyzing the
Saturn Agreement in terms of what it perceived as an existing
104. Court decisions exhibit a trend towards interpreting the prohibition
against employer dominance in § 8(a)(2) of the NLRA to regulate actual em-
ployer dominance of the union, rather than potential dominance. Compare
NLRB v. Newport News Co., 308 U.S. 241, 251 (1939) (affirming the disestab-
lishment of employer-assisted labor organization despite showing of employer
"good motive" and employee satisfaction) and Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.
v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 930, 940 (1st Cir. 1940) ("In applying the statutory test of
independence it is immaterial that the plan had in fact not engendered, or in-
deed had obviated, serious labor disputes in the past .... 1"), cert. denied, 312
U.S. 710 (1941) with NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208, 1214-16 (1st
Cir. 1979) (reversing NLRB ruling finding potential domination); Federal-Mo-
gul Corp. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915, 918 (6th Cir. 1968) (stating that unstable la-
bor organization susceptible to managerial control does not create inference of
actual dominance) and Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165, 167-
68 (7th Cir. 1955) (implementing actual dominance analysis for § 8(a)(2) dis-
putes). Courts also consider employees' actual impressions of the employer's
conduct and the employer's motives for participation. See, e.g., NLRB v. New-
man-Green, Inc., 401 F.2d 1, 4-6 (7th Cir. 1968) (attempt to affect union elec-
tion improper motive but facilitating committee activity was not). See
generally Note, supra note 13, at 511 ("Although never made explicit, the
traditional standard in § 8(a)(2) cases is essentially a per se rule.").
105. See Advice Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1189, 1191 (citing First
Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981)); Harte & Co., 278
N.L.R.B. No. 128, slip op. at 6 (March 13, 1986); Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B.
891 (1964).
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relationship between GM and the UAW,106 the General Counsel
subjected the issue of individual rights to less rigid scrutiny.
Through this unquestioning reliance on precedent involv-
ing an existing collective bargaining relationship, however, the
General Counsel failed to scrutinize carefully the differences
between the interests of UAW leadership negotiating the Sat-
urn Agreement and the newly hired Saturn employees. UAW
officials could have granted concessions in the Saturn negotia-
tions to protect the rights of members at other UAW facilities
at the expense of the Saturn employees. Likewise, members at
other facilities, to protect their own positions, could have pres-
sured negotiators to bargain conservatively with regard to con-
cessions at Saturn. The General Counsel's reliance on
precedent involving existing collective bargaining relationships
simply ignores the Saturn facility's status as an election unit
separate from other GM facilities.
Because the auto industry and the UAW share common in-
terests, however, it is reasonable to conclude that UAW negotia-
tors knew the principle concerns of automotive workers, and
negotiated with those interests in mind.10 7 Examination of the
Saturn Agreement supports this conclusion. Although interests
of the Saturn employees were arguably unique, 08 the Saturn
106. The General Counsel repeatedly commented on the ties between GM
and the UAW, including union members' anticipation of the move to Saturn,
Advice Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1192 (114,000 to 145,250 workers would
be willing to work at Saturn), the long-standing relationship between GM and
the UAW, id. at 1189 ("GM and the UAW have had a long and productive col-
lective bargaining relationship."), and their present joint ventures, see id at
1188 ("GM and the UAW reached agreement on a national contract... which
included the development of a... program to protect employees from layoff
.... "). The General Counsel nevertheless sidestepped a reference to the rela-
tionship and negotiations of the Saturn Agreement as a "collective bargaining
relationship." See id. at 1191 ("The current evidence is insufficient to establish
that GM and UAW ... have entered into a functioning collective bargaining
relationship before any employees have begun working at Spring Hill."). Rec-
ognition of such a relationship would have jeopardized the General Counsel's
solution to the problem of early recognition of the UAW: conditioning the Sat-
urn Agreement's implementation on the UAW's future achievement of major-
ity status. Id.
107. See supra note 32 and accompanying text; infra notes 111, 114-15 and
accompanying text. As the NLRB observed, UAW leadership must consider
"the desires and the needs of the various employees . . .on the basis of em-
ployee classification, plant product, fabrication function, and other criterion
[sic] which bear no relationship to any single plant unit concept, and which cut
across and completely disregard the original unit certifications." General Mo-
tors Corp. (Cadillac Motor), 120 N.L.R.B. 1215, 1220 (1958). Employees in each
local unit must ratify this national contract before it becomes effective. Id
108. The Saturn Agreement contained several provisions unlike those in
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Agreement was written in only very general terms, with
clauses providing for future changes if necessary. 0 9 In addi-
tion, the Agreement focused on wages and job security, primary
areas of concern to all auto workers. Negotiators from the
UAW were undoubtedly well-versed in these areas.
The individual interests of new Saturn employees were
also protected by the oversight power of the existing member-
ship. Aware that negotiations at one facility could have reper-
cussions at their own facilities, the existing membership
monitored the activities of UAW leaders.1" 0 Industrywide un-
ions, particularly those in the auto industry, may have to make
certain concessions at one site to protect the industry as a
whole.:"' In return for those concessions, plant workers know
other labor contracts. Saturn employees were to be compensated on a salary
basis, unlike other auto workers who are traditionally paid on an hourly basis.
Also unlike other labor agreements, the Saturn Agreement provided for con-
sensus decision making within independent work units, a strong job security
clause, and a compensation program based partially on merit. Saturn Agree-
ment, supra note 1, at 9-11, 15-18.
109. See, e.g., id at 28 ("The parties are specifically empowered to make
mutually satisfactory modifications, additions or deletions to the Agree-
ment.").
110. See Slaughter, UAW Convention Debates 'Saturnization" LABOR
NOTES, July 1986, at 16, 16. This monitoring results from the industry tradi-
tion of creating a pattern contract that is emulated in all later negotiations.
See infra note 114 and accompanying text. For example, a wage reduction at
one plant could damage conditions at other plants.
The UAW leadership did not give final approval for the Saturn Agreement
without subjecting the issue to debate among the present membership. Mem-
bers questioned the Agreement's impact on traditional forms of bargaining and
on other plants in the industry. Some workers voiced concern that a pattern
of relinquishing concessions to obtain early cooperation would be established.
Despite the extensive debate by present membership, a resolution calling for
no changes was adopted. Id. at 16-17.
One labor expert asserts that union leadership is restricted by the union
members' dominant loyalty to the local union. Summers, supra note 70, at 387
(the reach of the national union "is limited, for the union member's dominant
loyalty is almost always to his local union and he jealously defends its auton-
omy against encroachments by the national union"). Also, American labor
leadership obviously cannot stray far from membership opinion, because in
most unions officers are directly elected. Id. See generally J. STIEBER, GOV-
ERNING THE UAW 160-68 (1962) ("[The] entire political structure of the UAW
... is geared to keeping the leadership attuned to what the membership is
thinking .... ).
111. See Hildebrand, Joint Negotiation, a Match of Bargaining Power,
MONTHLY LAB. REv., July 1968, at 22, 23. Hildebrand states: "To match busi-
ness bargaining power, the unions are seeking increased power for themselves,
by centralizing the ambient of negotiations. To do so, they must sacrifice the
tradition of local negotiations and organizational autonomy, a price that they
seem quite willing to pay." Ia Traditionally, local unions concede to industry
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that their interests are protected on an industry-wide scale.
The practices of the auto industry and the Saturn parties, to-
gether with roughly similar working conditions throughout the
industry, indicate that the General Counsel correctly deter-
mined that the "election" unit distinction is an arbitrary dis-
tinction. In an industry dominated by one or several large
unions, such a distinction exists merely to allow more efficient
administration of labor relations. 1 2
In addition to the safeguards provided by the Saturn
Agreement and the existing membership, the General Counsel
found that the historical relationship between the UAW and
the automakers gave additional protection to individual inter-
ests. National UAW leaders traditionally negotiate for most
auto plants in the United States, 1 3 developing a contract with
one automaker that is followed at all other auto plants. 14
Plant level negotiations normally supplement the negotiations
of the larger contract for the entire industry.115 Cooperative
concessions in times of recession indicate that the UAW and the
union negotiators on issues of wages and job security while retaining negotiat-
ing power over items of local interest. See Another Look at Coordinated Bar-
gaining, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 1968, at III, III-V.
112. In effect, the many election units function as part of the same bargain-
ing unit. Legal theory does not recognize an integrated relationship between
separate "election" units as the automobile plants traditionally have been
treated, but does support an integration of the "bargaining" unit. See General
Motors Corp. (Cadillac Motor), 120 N.L.R.B. 1215, 1218, 1220 (1958) (election
historically held at one plant at a time, but workers can lawfully negotiate at
multiplant level); supra note 32 and accompanying text.
113. In 1937 General Motors recognized the UAW as bargaining agent, and
was soon followed by Chrysler. J. RAE, THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE INDUS-
TRY 82 (1984). In 1941 the UAW began negotiating with the Ford automotive
facilities, establishing itself as sole collective bargaining agent throughout the
American automobile industry. See id. at 83.
114. See General Motors Corp. (Cadillac Motors), 120 N.L.R.B. 1215, 1218
(1958) ("UAW and GM have engaged in single common, centralized bargaining
negotiations for all the plants... [from which] there emerged ... a single con-
tract, nationwide and company-wide in scope . . . ."). The practice is referred
to as pattern bargaining. See, e.g., R. REICH & J. DONAHUE, NEW DEALS: THE
CHRYSLER REVIVAL AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 121 (1985) (UAW President,
Douglas Fraser, refers to Chrysler concessions as a departure from the
industry-wide pattern, defying "42 years of tradition"). Workers at all union-
represented American auto plants have come to expect to receive similar
wages and benefits. See id.
115. General Motors Corp. (Cadillac Motor), 120 N.L.R.B. at 1219 (national
contract provides for separate supplemental agreement at the plant level). Be-
cause the NLRB does not assume to choose the most appropriate unit, but
only one of several proper choices, the bargaining units are free to reconsoli-
date to bargain together.
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automakers have developed a stable negotiating relationship. 16
By assuming that the preexisting relationship between GM and
the UAW protected individual interests, the General Counsel
accurately assessed the stable negotiating practices that already
exist in the auto industry.
The Saturn Agreement did accomodate individual, plant-
specific interests, however. By conditioning the Saturn Agree-
ment on the employees' approval, 1 7 the General Counsel ade-
quately addressed the specific concerns of Saturn employees.
The Agreement provided that either party could change its
terms following the full staffing of the Saturn plant.118 In addi-
tion, the Agreement conditioned majority status on the creation
of an attractive agreement for newly hired Saturn employees.
Like the accretion situation, transferring UAW members and
new unaffiliated employees would not automatically grant ma-
jority status to the union.1 9 By requiring majority approval at
the time of Saturn's opening, the General Counsel protected
unaffiliated employees from a potentially adverse, irrevocable
agreement negotiated by leadership that could be perceived
as inadequately representing the interests of unaffiliated
employees. 20
These considerations support the General Counsel's conclu-
sion that the early negotiations adequately protected individual
interests. By assuming that those negotiations were lawful,
however, the General Counsel avoided in-depth analysis of the
Saturn Agreement's possibly discriminatory impact upon non-
union workers.' 2 ' Given the Foundation's obvious concern for
preserving the rights of the individual, the General Counsel's
inattentiveness to the discrimination issue flaws the opinion.
116. See Pleas for Wage Relief Flood into the UAW, Bus. WK., Feb. 16,
1981, at 27, 27 ("Not only are some 72,000 Chrysler workers taking pay cuts...
but thousands of UAW members employed by Chrysler suppliers are also
agreeing to wage freezes and other sacrifices.").
117. Advice Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1191.
118. Saturn Agreement, supra note 1, at 28-29.
119. Advice Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1190 ("[1It is not a foregone
conclusion that employees will be actually represented by the UAW .... ").
120. Board policy does not assure individual employees of a right to choose
their own contract terms upon hiring, but does attempt to limit representation
to those with similar interests. As one AFL-CIO employee stated: "Every
union member has a first day at work when you work under a contract into
which you had no input. Terms can be changed the next time the local union
bargains with the company." Telephone interview with Karin Green, Director
of Labor Resource Service, AFL-CIO (Feb. 11, 1987).
121. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
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2. Implications of the Saturn Agreement for
Nonunion Workers
The General Counsel completely ignored the cumulative
industrywide impact if a Saturn-type agreement were adopted
by other companies. The Saturn Agreement guaranteed that
eighty percent of the work force at the new site would be affili-
ated with the UAW.1 22 The potential for a coercive environ-
ment is readily apparent. Workers seeking entry into the
industry will undoubtedly attempt to maximize their job oppor-
tunities by affiliating with a union that obtains obvious prefer-
ences. Although the Saturn Agreement may not overtly
discriminate against individuals currently in the industry, these
agreements may create an incentive to join a union simply to
expand job opportunities.
The General Counsel also failed to consider whether the
Saturn Agreement adequately protected unaffiliated workers.
While acknowledging that the preference given to UAW-
affiliated bargaining units could detrimentally affect the em-
ployment prospects of unaffiliated workers, 12 3 the General
Counsel reasoned that the preference was not discriminatory
because it extended the job preference at Saturn to nonunion
members affiliated with UAW units.1 24 In taking this position,
however, the General Counsel ignored the effect of the Saturn
Agreement on nonunion workers not affiliated with the UAW.
Because the Agreement gave current GM employees a hiring
preference, other workers could not improve their chances of
being hired at Saturn by joining the UAW.12 5 In the sense that
management refused to consider a worker because of a lack of
affiliation with the UAW, the Agreement was discriminatory.
The General Counsel provided no statistics indicating
either how many members of UAW bargaining units were not
union members or how many of these nonunion workers were
likely to be precluded from employment. The General Counsel
also provided no data as to the number of nonunion workers ac-
122. Saturn Agreement, supra note 1, at 14-15.
123. Advice Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1190; see also supra note 85 and
accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
125. Candidates for work at Saturn cannot make themselves more attrac-
tive to GM by promising to join the UAW because the hiring preference ex-
tends to GM workers from UAW-represented units. A UAW member who is
not in a GM unit may not receive the preference. This suggests that in addi-
tion to retaining a productive relationship with the UAW, GM also wanted the
experience that workers from existing units could offer.
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tually benefitted. It will be difficult in the future, therefore, to
determine the number of nonunion employees within the unit
that would make an agreement nondiscriminatory. Unfortu-
nately, the General Counsel's opinion could be read to permit
an employer to agree to hire predominately unionized units
with only one or two nonunion members.
Despite these concerns, however, the General Counsel cor-
rectly found that the Saturn Agreement, in the context of a
long-term labor relationship, did not discriminate against the
individual employee. Although the Agreement gave a hiring
preference at the Saturn facility to GM employees at other
plants, that preference was nondiscriminatory. Assuming, as
the General Counsel did, that the actions of the UAW and GM
were the legitimate product of an existing relationship, the law
permits labor and management to exclusively benefit union af-
filiates. 26 Likewise, any employee who pays union fees should
enjoy the fruits of UAW negotiations. The benefits derived
from unionism would be negated if unaffiliated workers were
treated as affiliated workers. Furthermore, evidence indicates
that GM's preferential hiring was not based on union affilia-
tion, but rather was an attempt to obtain an experienced,
skilled work force. As the General Counsel noted, the pool of
workers available at Saturn included union and nonunion
members. In effect, the Saturn Agreement merely facilitated
access to that pool.
A discriminatory effect, regardless of the context, may also
be justified when the benefits derived through cooperation are
balanced against the possibly discriminatory effect. Given the
substantial benefits of cooperation for most workers, the NLRB
should tolerate an effect that may remotely discriminate
against a few candidates if the parties' primary motive was not
discriminatory.2 7 As has been demonstrated in the United
126. Union contracts historically benefit their members and exclude those
workers who do not choose union representation. Without the ability to collec-
tively exclude those who do not choose unionism, the benefit of acting as a col-
lective is destroyed. Workers would be free to act independently to the
detriment of their fellow employees, yet reap the benefits of collective action.
See Not That Unusual, NAT'L REV., Nov. 7, 1986, at 19, 19 ("Most unions exist
to give monopoly power to their members. To the extent they succeed, they
drive wages ... higher than if the union did not exist.").
127. The Board does not assure every worker that he or she will be able to
exercise § 7 rights upon hiring. It does, however, attempt to assure workers
that those with similar interests did in fact choose the existing representative.
For example, the Board has established the contract bar doctrine which pre-
cludes a rival union from challenging a current and valid contract for up to
1987]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
States and other countries, cooperation in the early stages of
plant development increases the workers' input into decision
making, improves the work setting and conditions of employ-
ment, and establishes a rapport with management.-23 By in-
creasing the worker's role in all facets of the work place, early
cooperation can improve the quality of collective bargaining.
As a result of early cooperation, a more democratic relationship
develops between the employer and employees. The benefits to
workers, management, and labor relations may outweigh the
detriment to excluded candidates for employment.
3. The Effect of the Saturn Agreement on the Employee's
Choice of Representation
The National Right to Work Foundation charged that the
Saturn Agreement precluded the employees from freely choos-
ing representation through an election or card count. The
thrust of the Foundation's claim was twofold: premature recog-
nition both precluded workers from voicing their opinions on
representation and "tainted" any later recognition poll by un-
fairly benefitting the UAW. If the Saturn Agreement coerced
employees to elect the UAW as the union representative, the
Foundation's claims would be justified. Under the NLRA, the
parties' conduct would have been unlawful.
Despite the assertions made by the Foundation, however,
the Saturn Agreement provided individual employees with sub-
stantial opportunity to exercise their section 7 rights. By condi-
tioning the continuation of the GM-UAW relationship at Saturn
on a recognition poll, the General Counsel ensured that the
workers would be permitted to accept or reject the union. In
fact, the Agreement provided workers with a sample of the bar-
gaining effectiveness of the UAW, effectively improving their
knowledge before a vote. Early cooperation at Saturn also per-
mitted the individual employee seeking labor representation to
take part in immediate decisions that shaped the work environ-
ment and bargaining relationship, enhancing the quality of
those rights. A narrow interpretation of section 7 of the NLRA
would have precluded such participation.129
three years following execution. See, e.g., Avco Mfg. Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. 1396,
1399-1400 (1953); Electro-Metallurgical Co., 72 N.L.R.B. No. 253, 19 L.R.R.M.
1291 (1947). The contract bar theory sacrifices employee choice in order to
"stabilize for reasonable periods of time established collective bargaining rela-
tionships." Avco Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. at 1105.
128. See supra notes 11, 12 and accompanying text.
129. Without a flexible approach, the NLRB runs the risk of discouraging
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In addition, the General Counsel would have been acting
prematurely if it had discussed the effect of the Saturn Agree-
ment on an upcoming election. Under the circumstances, the
Board might not even require an election.1 30 Normally, when
an employer voluntarily recognizes a union, a card count is ade-
quate to ensure majority status.13 1 Here, the enthusiasm of GM
in engaging the UAW's participation indicates that the employ-
ees would voluntarily recognize the UAW at a later date. In
such a situation, the effect of the Saturn Agreement upon the
"laboratory conditions" of an election becomes irrelevant.132
Furthermore, the argument that the Saturn Agreement
gives an unfair advantage to the UAW is speculative, absent a
challenge from a rival union.133 Without such a challenge, the
effect of the Saturn Agreement on an election cannot be deter-
mined.134 As earlier noted, the timing of the benefit is particu-
larly relevant to analysis of the effect of benefits upon an
election. 35 The Board traditionally evaluates both the influ-
ence that the grant of benefits would potentially have on the
employees and the employer's efforts to disassociate the bene-
fits from the election. 3 6 Without evidence of GM's actions
leading up to an election, it is impossible to determine whether
the election setting was disrupted. As the current trend in la-
bor law indicates, potential detriment is inadequate justification
cooperation. See, e.g., Cordova, supra note 71, at 137 (bureaucracy and legal
requirements are discouraging workers and management in Scandinavian
countries from cooperation).
130. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
132. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 34-37 (discussing Board view of ac-
tivities disruptive of laboratory conditions).
133. Cf. Advice Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1191 n.8 (stating that claim
by rival union against GM would not negate Saturn Agreement because the
agreement remains a prediction of a relationship until the UAW achieves ma-
jority status).
134. The NLRA does not prohibit an employer from expressing a prefer-
ence for a particular union. See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 8,
at 286-87. Lawful cooperation is that "which does not have the effect of inhib-
iting self-organization and free collective bargaining." Federal-Mogul Corp. v.
NLRB, 394 F.2d 915, 918 (6th Cir. 1968). To determine when a stated prefer-
ence or cooperative actions have risen to the level of unlawful interference,
the NLRB must examine the totality of the circumstances. Coamo Knitting
Mills, Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 579, 582 (1964). Without a development of the record
concerning the Saturn Agreement and evidence of unlawful support of the
UAW, as opposed to a rival union, unlawful preference for the UAW remains a
speculative assertion.
135. See supra note 45.
136. See supra note 45.
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for preventing an agreement.137
A final justification for the General Counsel's decision is
the NLRA's goal of creating stability in labor-management re-
lations by protecting the collective bargaining process. 13 The
General Counsel emphasized that the Saturn Agreement estab-
lished a promising pattern of cooperation and fortified the sta-
ble, existing collective bargaining relationship that had
developed between a labor organization and management.139
Protecting a long-standing relationship encourages workers to
participate in collective bargaining and prevents immediate
challenge from rival unions. 140 This in turn strengthens un-
ions. They no longer need to focus resources on fighting for
worker support, but can instead organize to promote their in-
terests with management. In light of present economic condi-
tions, the merits of the Saturn Agreement indicate that
stabilization of the collective bargaining relationship will offset
the detriment of a possible challenge to representation.
B. A RECOMMENDED APPROACH TO FUTURE
COOPERATIVE VENTURES
To protect workers' interests in future cases involving
early cooperation, the NLRB should focus on the similarities of
interests between negotiators and newly hired workers. This
will help to ensure that preliminary negotiations adequately
137. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. As suggested, the new
trend in the courts is not to prohibit cooperation based on speculative reasons.
As the courts recognize, a disincentive to attempt cooperation would be cre-
ated by a policy which eliminated successful programs for unsubstantiated rea-
sons. See Note, supra note 13, at 531 (under traditional § 8(a)(2) standards,
employees only have option of a traditional union separate from the employer
or no union at all; with new interpretation, their options are expanded.).
138. See Comment, The National Labor Relations Act at Fifty: Roots Revis-
ited, Heart Rediscovered, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 1059, 1073-75 (1985) (purpose of the
NLRA was to promote industrial peace through the elimination of the causes
of strikes). The policy provision of the NLRA states:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employ-
ees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from in-
jury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce
by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest,
by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of
industrial disputes.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
139. See Advice Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1189 (the Saturn Agree-
ment contains "many of the fruits" of a long and prosperous labor
relationship).
140. The same theory underlies the doctrine of a contract bar. See supra
note 128 and accompanying text.
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protect workers' interests. As when determining the correct
bargaining unit,1 41 the Board should determine the number of
transferring employees, industry bargaining history and prac-
tices, the similarities between management at existing facilities
and new facilities, working conditions, and the similarities in
workers' desires and interests. By focusing on these factors,
the General Counsel will be able to determine whether prelimi-
nary negotiations adequately protect the employees' interests.
These are not the only relevant considerations, however.
The Board must also examine the relationship between man-
agement and the union to determine whether early negotia-
tions promote an existing, prosperous relationship.142 Given
the potentially discriminatory effect of early negotiations, the
Board should accept a hiring preference only if a cooperative
relationship exists between the parties. 43
The NLRB must also examine the time period between the
early negotations and a recognition poll to determine whether
the terms of the agreement will unlawfully benefit a particular
union to the detriment of rival unions.144 In its analysis the
Board should examine the type of benefits offered and the con-
ditions placed on those benefits.
Finally, the NLRB should require that the contract contain
a modification clause, permitting either party to alter the pre-
liminary agreement if substantive changes occur. As the Gen-
eral Counsel indicated, the ultimate test of an agreement's
legitimacy is the election or card count held upon the hiring of
an initial complement of workers.
Cooperative ventures in the preliminary stages of plant de-
velopment improve the workers' ability to control the condi-
tions of employment. The NLRB should therefore encourage
them in an effort to enhance industrial stability and peace. De-
spite the allegations of the National Right to Work Foundation,
the facts show that individual employees' rights were not irrev-
ocably denied by the Saturn Agreement. Given their substan-
tially positive effects, the NLRB should encourge early
cooperative agreements to benefit labor-management relations.
CONCLUSION
Pre-election cooperative agreements could threaten the
141. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 108-12.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 134-38.
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worker's right to determine union representation. Applying a
pragmatic analysis to the cooperative Saturn venture, the Gen-
eral Counsel recognized that economic and industrial safe-
guards adequately met the protections required under existing
doctrine. By focusing on stable industry practices and the over-
riding principles of the NLRA, the General Counsel established
a flexible form of analysis for future Saturn-like claims. By
conditioning the Saturn Agreement upon majority approval,
the General Counsel ensured that the Agreement adequately
protected Saturn employees' rights and supported the goal of
industry stability. Although workers' rights remain critical to
NLRA policy, they can be fostered, rather than inhibited, by
cooperation in early stages of plant development.
Lori M. Beranek
